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oJLLETIN NO. 32 JULY, W7 

THE AMERICAN RIGHTS LEAGUE 

For Upholding the Duty of the Republic 
in International Relations 

2 WEST 45TH STREET, NEW YORK 

® 



THE UNITED STATES AND PAN-GERMANISM 

BY ANDRE CHERADAME 



The present situation in Europe is due to two factors: first, 
the almost complete fulfillment by the Germans of a plan which 
they had long been preparing with the utmost care; second, the 
repeated mistakes of the Allies in their carrying on of the war 
— mistakes which alone have permitted the Germans to consum- 
mate their plan almost without opposition. 

The Pan-Germanist programme of 191 1 called for the establish- 
ment of Prussian hegemony over a territory of nearly 4,015,000 
square kilometres — in other words, besides actual conquest in the 
East and West, it meant the indirect yet effective seizure of Austria- 
Hungary, the Balkan States, and Turkey. At the beginning of 
191 7 — before the capture of Bagdad by the English and the strategic 
retreat of the German troops in the West — the programme had 
been realized to the extent of 3,600,000 square kilometres — that 
is, in nine-tenths of its entirety. 

The basic explanation of this achievement lies partly in the 
fact that, if the Germans are outlaws they are very intelligent 
outlaws, perfectly trained for the task of seizing the booty on which 
they have set their hearts ; partly in the fact that the leaders of 
the Allies, intelligent and animated by the best intentions though 
they are, have been quite unenlightened as to the multiple realities 
of the European tangle, a thoroughgoing knowledge of which is 
absolutely necessary for the conduct of the terrible war in progress. 

II 

The capital mistakes made by the Allies are as follows: They 
believed that a friendly agreement with Bulgaria was possible, 
although that country was treaty-bound to Berlin and Constan- 
tinople long before the war. They cherished illusions concerning 
King Constantine, who, above all else, was brother-in-law of the 
Kaiser. They organized the Dardanelles expedition, which should 

"olograph 



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never have been attempted. Even if this operation had been 
judged technically feasible, its futility would have been apparent 
if the Allies had realized — and it was their arch-error not to realize 
-that the strategic key to the whole European war was the Danube. 
The mere occupation by the Allies of the territory stretching from 
Montenegro through Serbia to Roumania, would have resolved 
all the essential problems of the conflict. Cut off from the Central 
Empires, Bulgaria and Turkey, whose arsenals were depleted by 
the Balkan disturbances of 1912-1913, would have found it im- 
possible to make a strong stand against the Allies. Turkey, who 
had been imprudent enough to defy them, would have been obliged 
to open the Straits within a very short time, for sheer lack of muni- 
tions to defend them. This opening of the Straits would have 
been effected by a strong pressure by the Allies on the south of 
Hungary. Moreover, by the same action the Central Empires 
would have been barred from reinforcements and supplies from the 
Orient. Germany, finding herself cut off on land in the South as 
she was blockaded by sea in the North, would have been obliged 
to come to terms. 

Unhappily, the general staffs of the Allies in the West were 
not prepared to grasp the politico-scientific character of the war, 
especially the cardinal importance of the economic factor. This 
ignorance remained unenlightened until Roumania was crushed 
in 191 6. As a result, for twenty-seven months the Balkans were 
looked on by the leaders in the West as being of only secondary 
military importance. 

The direct result of the mistakes of the Allies, coupled with 
the methodical procedure of Berlin, has been the realization of 
nine-tenths of Pan-Germany. 

This Pan-Germany is composed of two elements. First, the 
great occupied territories taken by Germany from Belgium, France, 
Russia, Serbia, and Roumania. Second, the practical seizure 
effected by her at the expense of her own allies: Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria, and Turkey; for, as a matter of fact, the Quadruple 
Alliance is nothing but a great illusion carefully fostered by the 
Kaiser for the purpose of concealing the true situation from the 
neutrals — particularly the United States. If one wishes to see 
things as they are, one must realize that Austria-Hungary, Bul- 
garia, and Turkey are not the Allies — that is, the equals — of Ger- 
many. These three states are practically the vassals of Berlin, 
in whose sight they scarcely count for more than Saxony or Bavaria. 
The principal proof of this state of affairs lies in the fact that the 
Kaiser yields an uncontested supremacy from Hamburg to the 
British front at Bagdad. 

Since the beginning of hostilities there has been a formidable 
extension of Prussian militarism. At first, it held in its grasp only 
the sixty-eight million people of the German Empire. By April, 
191 5, it had extended and organized its influence among the thirty 
millions of Austro-Hungarians, who until that time had taken 



orders from their own independent military chiefs. After October- 
November, 191 5, — the date of Serbia's downfall, — the Prussian 
system reached out to Bulgaria and Turkey. By taking account 
of these extensions and adding together the populations of the 
territories occupied by Germany, together with those of her in- 
fatuated allies, one finds that to-day — April, 191 7 — Prussian 
militarism no longer controls sixty-eight million souls, as in the 
beginning of the war, but about one hundred and seventy-six 
million European and Ottoman subjects. 

This is the brutal, overwhelming fact which Americans must 
face if they wish to learn the sole solution of the war which will 
assure to them, as well as to the rest of the world, a durable peace. 

The following figures will show how the three groups of the 
population of Pan-Germany are divided at the beginning of 1 91 7: 



The Masters 

Germans 
The Vassals 

Magyars 

Bulgars 

Turks 
The Slaves 

French 

Belgians 

Alsatians, Lorrainers 

Danes 

Poles, Lithuanians 

Ruthenians 

Czechs 

Jugo-Slavs 

Roumanians 

Italians 

Armenians 

Levantines 

Ottoman Greeks 

Arabs 

Total 



(about) 



10,000,000"] 
5,000,000 
6,000,000 

3,000,000 

7,500,000 

1,500,000 

200,000 

22,000,000 
5,500,000 
8,500,000 

11,000,000 
8,000,000 
800,000 
2,000,000 
2,000,000 
2,000,000 
8,000,000 



73,000,000 
21,000,000 



82,000,000 



176,000,000 



To sum up, seventy-three million Germans rule over twenty- 
one million vassals and eighty-two million slaves, — Latin, Slavic, 
Semitic, belonging to thirteen different nationalities, — who are 
bearing the most cruel and unjustifiable yoke that the world has 
ever known. 

It is undeniable, moreover, that each extension ot Prussian 
militarism over a new territory has enabled Germany to prolong 
the struggle by obtaining new supplies of food, new reinforcements 
to press into her service and territory to exploit, new civil popula- 



tions, whose labor is made use of even in works of a military nature. 
As a result, the technical problem now confronting the Allies in 
Europe is, through the mistakes of their former leaders, infinitely 
more complicated than at the outbreak of hostilities. 

To-day Berlin, by means of Prussian terrorism methodically 
and pitilessly employed, disposes of the military and economic 
resources of one hundred and seventy-six million people, occupying 
a strategic position in the centre of Europe which is all to her profit. 
It is this very state of things, founded on the slavery of eighty-two 
millions of human beings, which is intolerable. 



Ill 

Many times, and rightly, the Allies have declared that it was 
not their object to exterminate the German people and bring about 
their political extinction. On the other hand, it is just and essen- 
tial to proclaim that Pan-Germany must be destroyed. On this 
depends the liberty, not only of Europe, but of the whole world. 
This is the point of view which, in the crisis of to-day, should prevail 
with Americans, for the following reasons: Suppose that Pan- 
Germany were able to maintain itself in its present position. It 
cannot be denied that its territory contains considerable latent 
military and economic resources, as well as strategic positions of 
world significance, like the Dardanelles. If these resources were 
freely exploited and developed to their highest pitch by the relent- 
less organizing spirit of Berlin, Prussianized Pan-Germany, divid- 
ing Europe in two, would dominate the Continent, uncontestably 
and indefinitely, by means of her crushing strength. France, 
Russia, England, Italy, ceasing to exist as great powers, could 
only submit to Germany's will. And Berlin, mistress of Europe, 
would soon realize, not merely the Hamburg-Bagdad and Antwerp- 
Bagdad railways, but the Brest-Bagdad line as well; for Brest has 
long been coveted secretly by the Pan-Germanists, who would 
make of it the great military and commercial transatlantic port 
of Prussianized Europe. 

Moreover, if Germany achieved the ruin of the Allies, it is 
entirely probable that the General Staff of William II would launch 
a formidable expedition against the United States without delay, 
in order to allow her no time to organize herself against the Prus- 
sian tyranny hypothetically dominating Europe. Even if Berlin 
felt it necessary to defer this step, Americans would none the less 
be forced to prepare for the inevitable struggle and to serve an 
apprenticeship to militarism which would be odious to them. If 
Americans, then see things as they really are, and perceive the 
dangers to which they are pledging their future, they will be con- 
vinced that they, quite as much as Europeans, have a vital interest 
in the annihilation of Pan-Germanism. In a word, it is clear that 
any peril accruing to the United States from Europe can arise only 



from so formidable a power as Pan-Germany, and not from a 
Germany kept within her legitimate frontiers, and forced to behave 
herself, by the balance of other powers. 

We must also realize that the moral considerations at stake 
are a matter of the liveliest interest to the United States. Can 
republican America allow the feudal spirit which kindled the torch 
of this war to triumph over the world? Granting for a moment 
that Germany were victorious, Russia, after a frightful reign of 
anarchy, would be forced to submit once more to the yoke of auto- 
cracy. As for the peoples of Western Europe, reduced to worse 
than slavery, they could only renounce their dearest ideals — the 
ideals for which they have shed their blood for centuries. 

The present war, then, is manifestly a struggle & outrance be- 
tween democracy and feudalism. To Americans as well as to 
Europeans falls the task, not only of preserving their corporeal 
independence, but of saving our common civilization. This can 
be accomplished only by the destruction of Pan-Germanism. 
Berlin, failing so far to crush the Allies completely, is bending 
every effort to maintaining Pan-Germany in its present position, 
so that, after peace is declared, it may crystallize and swiftly de- 
velop its full power. 

IV 

Let us face the cruel truth and say: the Allies may yet be 
completely vanquished if certain developments come about, or if 
new strategic mistakes are added to those portentous ones which 
nearly lost them the fight, in spite of the righteousness of their 
cause and their immense, if badly employed, latent resources. 
If we wish, then, really to understand the crisis of to-day and the 
mighty peril which still menaces the world's liberty, we must not 
shrink from meeting the realities of the military situation. We 
must be ready to face the most serious developments which can be 
conceived. Such an attitude implies, not pessimism, but that 
readiness for the worst which lies at the root of military wisdom. 

Let us now accept the following facts. The troops of France 
are beginning to be exhausted. The iniquitous administration of 
the Czar has seriously compromised the provisioning of the Russian 
army with food and munitions. In that vast country, it is possible 
that idealistic extremists may guide the revolution toward pacifism 
or anarchy. The swarming agents of Germany are working there 
without respite. If their efforts succeed, the strength of Russia 
will swiftly dissolve. This would practically insure a German 
victory, for, with the Russian armies demoralized, all the forces 
of Pan-Germany could be flung against the Franco-British front. 
Moreover, if, from the moral standpoint, the Berlin government 
is universally to be despised, the same cannot be said about her 
general technical military ability, whose elements are as follows: 



Berlin is incontestably mistress of Pan-Germany — that is, she 
has absolute disposal of vast resources in men and in the manifold 
products of a great territory with a population of one hundred and 
seventy-six millions. The Kaiser's Great General Staff, whose 
intellectual resourcefulness cannot be questioned, is quick to make 
the most of every lesson taught by the war. The annual levies of 
men from the various territories of Pan-Germany certainly out- 
number the losses sustained each year by her troops. It is, there- 
fore, in my opinion, a grave error to assume, as the Allies have 
done, that the Germans can be beaten by mere attrition of their 
forces. By organizing under one uniform system the soldiery 
furnished by the many different countries of Pan-Germany, Prus- 
sian militarism has unquestionably given its troops a cohesion and 
a unity which was unknown to the vassal-allies of Germany before 
the war. This state of affairs has undoubtedly added to the 
military effectiveness of the vast armies which take their orders 
from Berlin. 

The German military authorities most advantageously employed 
the respites given them by the strategic errors of the Allies. Never 
have the broad lines of trenches, the far-flung battle frontiers, been 
more powerfully guarded than now. Never have the Germans 
had more abundant stores of munitions. Never has the network 
of railways covering the length and breadth of Pan-Germany been 
so complete. Never has the Great General Staff, making full 
use of its central position, been better able to concentrate on any 
front with lightning speed. For these reasons, it is my opinion 
that we may safely say that never before has the Berlin govern- 
ment, from a military point of view, been so strong. The various 
statistics which justify such a conclusion are, I think, to be relied 
on. Even supposing them to be exaggerated, it is much better 
to run the risk of overestimating the enemy's strength than to 
underestimate it. Many of the Allies' mistakes sprang from neglect 
of this axiom. 



If the programme for 191 7, which we have good reason to attri- 
bute to the Germans, were substantially carried out (and, after 
all, this is not impossible), in six to eight months the United States 
would find themselves face to face with a Germany controlling the 
resources not only of the present-day Pan-Germany, but of all 
Europe. And, Americans, do not think your turn would be long 
in coming. Do not take it for granted that the German people, 
worn out by the endless horrors of war, would cry to their masters, 
"Peace at any price!" The German people, as I know them, filled 
with enthusiasm by a victory that would be without parallel in the 
history of the world, maddened by incalculable plunder, would 
follow the lead of their Emperor more blindly than ever. The 



pride and ambition of the Kaiser and his General Staff are so pro- 
digious that, unless all signs fail, they would give the United States 
no chance to organize against a Prussianized Europe. In eight or 
ten months, after new advances had been made to Japan, who would 
be isolated by the defeat of her Allies in Europe, and with the 
aid of the German-Mexicans and German-Americans whose mis- 
sion, as every one knows, is to paralyze by every possible means 
the military organization of the United States, it would be possible 
to look for ruthless action against America by the Pan-Germanized 
forces of Europe. 

The prediction of such extraordinary eventualities will no 
doubt seem fantastic and unprobable to many of my American 
readers. I beg them, nevertheless, to consider them seriously. 
As a matter of fact, if we consider what has been achieved by the 
Germans since August, 19 14, the events which I have forecast are 
much less amazing than those indicated by me in 1 901, when, in 
my book & Europe et la Question d'Autriche au Seuil du XXe Steele, 
I unmasked the Pan-German plot, which was then looked on as 
a mere phantasmagoria — although as a matter of fact it was so 
real that it now stands almost completely fulfilled. 

You Americans, then, should learn your lesson from the past. 
Your own best interest lays on you the obligation to face facts 
which may at present seem improbable, and to prepare yourselves 
without losing a day for meeting the gravest perils. As the situ- 
ation now stands, a delay in making a decision may involve disastrous 
results. For instance, the three weeks of parleying indulged in 
by the Allies before deciding to send troops to Serbia were of the 
utmost significance. Those three lost weeks simply prevented 
the Allies from achieving victory, and resulted in an unthinkable 
prolongation of the war. 

The surest, the most economical way for Americans to avoid 
excessive risks is to prepare at once for the severest kind of struggle 
on the hypothesis that the Allies may sustain grave reverses. 
Everything favors concerted action by the United States and the 
Allies. Their material and moral interests are identical, and, in 
doing away with autocracy, Russia removed the well-justified 
distrust felt in the United States for the land of the Czars. As 
we have seen, a German victory over Russia, involving the fall of 
Salonika and, later, the breaking of the Western front, would be 
unquestionably the most dangerous eventuality imaginable for the 
future security of the United States. American interest, therefore, 
demands not only that support should be given France and Great 
Britain, but that the United States should hasten to help the 
Russians, who will probably be called on first to meet the onslaught. 

By way of conclusion, let me again urge my point that the 
line of action morally and materially most profitable to the United 
States is that which, by achieving the total destruction of Pan- 
Germany and Prussian militarism, will terminate the horrible 
carnage once for all. 



The real problem for America is clearly to discern Pan-Germany 
lurking beneath the Quadruple Alliance of the Central Powers, 
and to decide to strike this Pan-Germany quick and hard. This 
is the one and only way to foil the odious Prussian militarism 
which threatens the liberty of the world. 

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